Introduction

The Community of West, Texas, suffered a catastrophic explosion on April 17, 2013, in the evening. Following the fire outbreak insider the West Fertilizer Plant, an enormous blast ensured and triggered millions of dollars in damage to the adjacent buildings, and killed a dozen individuals. The considerable proportion of people who succumbed to the explosion, sadly, were volunteered firefighters following their response to the outbreak. They never managed to retreat to a secure and safe distance prior to this devastating and heartbreaking explosion. Almost 200 injuries stood further reported to have had treatment at the nearby healthcare centers. It was indicated that the combination of the fire and colossal ammonium nitrate fertilizer stored at the plant triggered the explosion.

This disastrous event received instant coverage from the different news agencies alongside journalist crossways the nation. Various state, local alongside federal agencies responded to the explosion area as first responders as well as post-event detectives. The sixth Civil Support Team of the Army National Guard of Texas was also deployed to the scene the next day to help. The US Geological Survey indicated that the blast recorded the same as the 2.10 magnitude earthquake. It registered to have destroyed one hundred and forty homes and many other buildings including a middle school as well as a retirement home. The detectives indicated that the explosion had left behind a crater that measured almost 10 feet deep and as wide as 100 feet.

Understanding the Incident

The WFC was established in the year 1962. Since then, the company had been supplying fertilizer to farmers. By 2013, WFC was under the ownership of Adair Grain, Inc. The facility employed 9 employees. The Adair Grain Incorporation was under the full ownership of Donald Adair alongside Wanda, his wife. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), at the point of explosion, had inspected the plant last in the year 1985 (Dai et al., 2015). The plant was cited by OSHA to have had improper anhydrous ammonia storage and got fined 30 dollars. The company could have been fined as much as 1,000 dollars by OSHA. However, the officials of OSHA indicated that WFC plant was never on OSHA’s “National Emphasis Plan” for inspection since WFC was never a manufacturer firm and lacked any disastrous accident history. Moreover, the plant was never regarded as a major by the Environmental Protection Agency (Babrauskas, 2016).

Following the 2006 complainant regarding the smell of ammonia arising from the Plant, the Commission on Environmental Quality of Texas probed and subsequently its operator was cited for lacking a 2 stowage tanks permit which had ammonia (anhydrous) in store. After the operator had aligned the facility to the recommendations and regulations of the agency, it received the permit. Moreover, EPA, in 2006, fined the WFC’s owners 2,300 dollars for such problems as failure to file a program for risk management plan promptly. The United States Department of Transport’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (USDTPHMSA) in 2012 additionally fined WFC 5,250 dollars for breaches concerning storage of anhydrous ammonia (Huang et al., 2015).

The plant also suffered from a prolonged history of minor thefts by individuals who wanted to make methamphetamine via anhydrous ammonia. The WFC did not have burglar alarms leave alone fenced parameter. In the year 2009, the facility installed the surveillance system following the recommendation by the law enforcement. The WFC report filled with EPA regarding its emergency planning, the officials indicated that tanks for storing ammonia never represented substantial explosion or fire hazard. Indeed, the task remained intact even after the fire outbreak and the resulting explosion. The WFC’s last filling in late 2012 with EPA, they illustrated that the total ammonia nitrate stored amounted to 540,000 pounds and 110,000 pounds of the anhydrous one. The Homeland Security Secretary, Janet Napolitano informed the Senate detectives that WFC failed to disclose its stock of ammonium nitrate to the department. However, it is required by the Federal law that DHS remain notified anytime anyone stores over a ton of ammonium nitrate on hand or 180kg in case of combined ammonium nitrate with combustible substance.

Contributing Factors:

The investigations have revealed various factors that contributed to the West Fertilizer fire and explosion. The first factor is the FGAN pile contamination by combustible construction materials, storage of combustible substances adjacent to FGAN pile and PVC as well as roofing materials. Another contributing factor is the heating and ventilation within the fertilizer building. In respect of combustible construction, the FGAN-saturated wood in fires will be burned with increased intensity. The wood-constructed bins at the West Fertilizer Company probably resulted in both intensities as well as the spread of the fire in the entire building. In regards to heating and ventilation, the investigations revealed the depletion of oxygen as a result of the fire progression from the seed room.

There was limited ventilation at the ground level as the building had cupola with ventilation louvers on its top (Babrauskas, 2017). The findings of the investigations were reinforced by the historical FGAN, explosions. It is true that a significant number of these explosions have arisen from the enormous fire. Just like the West Fertilizer explosion, they have always occurred under twenty minutes to 60 minutes from the first report of the outbreak of fire. It is also true that slight differences in conditions of storage like ventilation, materials for construction, or even adjacent combustible storage significantly impact the detonability of the AN in case of fires.

Fire Outbreak and Blast

WFC plant trapped massive fire on Wednesday (17/04/2013). About twenty minutes following a fire outbreak report to the emergency dispatchers, there was a massive explosion. By 7:50:38 PM, CDT, the following day, the explosion came in full force of between 7.50 and 10 tons of the TNT while the firefighters were trying to douse its flames. A 93-foot broad crater was created by the explosion at the point the plant had been previously and led to 15 deaths and several injuries. Following weeks of probing, the initial fire cause stood a mystery. The authorities, however, ruled out natural causes, weather, ammonium nitrate in cars, and anhydrous ammonia as the likely causes. In 2016 May, it was announced by ATF that it was determined a predetermined set up was the cause of the fire.

Probe:

The interview was conducted amongst 300 individuals with one-hundred and sixty leads followed in the first probe. The Texas Department of Public Safety gave instruction on May 2013 to the Texas Rangers together with the Department of McLennan Sheriff to accompany the Office of Texas Marshall and the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives to investigate the explosion criminally. The ammonium nitrate fertilizer stocks which stowed in the bin within the building of fertilizer alongside seed on its facility were blamed by the detectives for the blast. However, the investigators did not succeed to identify the immediate trigger of the real fire which culminated in an explosion. A preliminary finding was released by the United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board on April 22, 2014. It discovered that WFC officials had failed to store the chemicals safely in the stockpile. Moreover, it was established that the local and state regulations regarding hazardous substances’ handling stood insufficiently.

The board chair, in a separate report, indicated that the fire and subsequent explosion stood preventable and needed not to have ensued. It arose from the WFC’s failure to assume essential steps towards a version of a preventable fire as well as the resultant explosion. It was also unearthed that the states, local and federal’s regulatory agencies were unable to acknowledge severe hazard to mitigate it leading to fire and subsequent explosion. It was established by the yearlong probe by CSB that 1,351.0 facilities crossways the US are storing ammonium nitrate, but lacked regulations in many of their areas to keep these plants away from areas that were populated. This led to a recommendation for revised and new regulations by Moure-Eraso to all efficient regulations which guarantee that every company is operating to similar high and desired standards.

Consequences:

Fatalities and Injuries:

The volunteer firefighters succumbed to the injuries from the explosion. A tremendous number of injuries amounting to one hundred injuries were reported. The blast area was analogous to Murrah Building in the city of Oklahoma when the effects of WFC explosion are compared to those of Oklahoma City bombing. Indeed fifty to seventy homes alongside enterprises got damaged. More than 100 individuals got injured and initially taken to makeshift triage established in the football field at West High School (Sansom, Stone & Horney, 2018). This site was late shifted to the community because of its closeness to the still-burning plant. Over forty injured people were received by Hillcrest Baptist Medical Center located in Waco and treated. Admissions were also made to Providence Healthcare Network and other medical facilities. It was announced by the authorities that 12 bodies were already recovered by April 19, 2013, while 60 people were still uncounted for with a minimum of two-hundred people reported to have had injuries. The 12 dead comprised of 10 first responders and 2 civilians firefighter volunteers. The ultimate number of deaths stood at 15 and between 160 and 200 injured individuals.

Damages:

The West Fertilizer Company plant was obliterated by the massive explosion. It triggered serious damage and additionally destroyed surrounding sites. However, initially, there was a variation in the number of individuals who died and even those who were injured. Besides the plant obliteration, the buildings that got damaged included a public West Middle School located adjacent to the WCF plant (Laboureur et al., 2016). Also destroyed was an adjacent fifty-unit, 2-story apartment building. The explosion further damaged neighboring West Rest Haven nursing home. This led to the evacuation of numerous residents. Several of such nursing residents got cuts from the glass being flown as a result of the explosion (Yonekawa et al., 2014).

However, the emergency officials on the scene indicated that a significant proportion of the recorded injuries were never life-threatening. Some residents that attempted to get back to their initially destroyed homes on April 20, 2013, were sent away since the gas tanks were still leaking and caused small fires. The US, Morristown’s Fire Insurance indicated that merely one million dollars were covering WFC plant liability insurance. The company and state officials showed that such an amount never even started to cover the damage costs. Moreover, Texas law permits the fertilizer storage plant to operate in the absence of any liability insurance, when where hazardous substances are stored.

Responses

The people who were residing near the West had reported that the explosion appeared to be an earthquake. The explosion was recorded as a 2.10 magnitude tremor by the US Geological Survey. The blast was loud enough to be heard in neighboring DeSoto, Waxahachie, and Hillsboro and even as farthest as Arlington. The blast blew out the windows in Abbott, seven miles of West. A statement was given by the Governor of Texas, Perry Rick on April 17, 2013, in the evening. This statement entailed an explanation of how the development following the blast was being monitored as well as the accumulation of information as the details were emerging regarding the explosion. The Governor further explained how they had mobilized the resources from the state to assist the local authorities (Metzger et al., 2016).

As a result of the fumes which were highly toxic as well as a vast figure of families that were displaced, the West Independent School District responded by announcing the closure of all the 5 district schools till further notice. The school was subsequently resumed on April 22, 2013. Neighboring school districts including Penelope ISD and Abbot Independent School District (ISD) were further shut down for a whole day. It was indicated by the Waco law enforcement officers that they would be treating site for the blast as a crime scene. A national response team was announced by the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives to be dispatched on April 18, 2013 (morning hours). The team included canine units, explosive experts, and fire investigators to probe the crime scene.

A standalone federal agency, the United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, dispatched its main probe team the site to start the search for what caused the explosion. In the morning of April 18, 2013, both Texas Task Force 2 Urban Search and Rescue and the Urban Search and Rescue Texas Force 1 were dispatched to help in both searches alongside rescue (Babrauskas, 2018). The Texas A&M Forest Service’s incident management team was further dispatched alongside the Veterinary Emergency Team. The McLennan County was subsequently declared by Governor Rick as a disaster site with President Obama issuing an Emergency Declaration on April 22, 2013, thereby affording the state desired aid with seventy percent federal funding. The Texas National Guard, on April 18, 2013, also sent the 6th Civil Support Team members to explosion site for air quality testing as well as assesses the biological and chemical hazards. FEMA rejected extra aid on June 13, 2013, to the town due to the Texas state ability to offer essential funds to recover and rebuild (Davis, DeBold & Marsegan, 2017). Nevertheless, the original decision made by FEMA was reversed on August 2, 2013, thereby approving the West’s main disaster declaration.

Changes to the Regulations

In 2014, one year following the incident, the fertilizer storage regulations still stood unaltered. However, in the year 2015, the House Bill 942 was passed by Texas Legislature to regulate both inspection and storage of ammonium nitrate alongside granting the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality alongside the local fire marshals authority to regulation affecting as well as enforcement.

Conclusion

As seen from the discussion, this fire and subsequent blats at the WFC facility stood a preventable incident. It is clear that there were insufficiencies in regulations and this reinforces the need to have severe regulatory changes. Indeed, the event could have happened anywhere since the federal government failed terribly to bolster weak local oversight of such facilities. It is shocking that OSHA officials only checked the facility on West back in 1985. Indeed, it is even surprising that the management of the plant just paid a thirty dollar fine. If the regulation is never revised and new ones brought to force, it is apparent that this incident will probably ensue again not only in Texas but also beyond its boundaries. The challenge is the lack of governance and not the government. This is indeed a straightforward result of a well-recorded twentieth-century allergy to efficient and effective hazardous substances, transportation and energy industries regulation in the United States.

References

Babrauskas, V. (2016). Explosions of ammonium nitrate fertilizer in storage or transportation are preventable accidents. Journal of hazardous materials, 304, 134-149.

Babrauskas, V. (2017). The West, Texas, ammonium nitrate explosion: a failure of regulation. Journal of fire sciences, 35(5), 396-414.

Babrauskas, V. (2018). The ammonium nitrate explosion at West, Texas: A disaster that could have been avoided. Fire and Materials, 42(2), 164-172.

Dai, K., Wang, J., Huang, Z., & Felix Wu, H. (2015). Investigations of structural damage caused by the fertilizer plant explosion at West, Texas. II: ground shock. Journal of the performance of constructed facilities, 30(4).

Davis, S., DeBold, T., & Marsegan, C. (2017). Investigation findings and lessons learned in the West fertilizer explosion. Journal of fire sciences, 35(5), 379-395.

Huang, Z., Dai, K., Wang, J., & Wu, H. F. (2015). Investigations of structural damage caused by the fertilizer plant explosion at West, Texas. I: air-blast incident overpressure. Journal of the performance of constructed facilities, 30(4),.

Laboureur, D. M., Han, Z., Harding, B. Z., Pineda, A., Pittman, W. C., Rosas, C., … & Mannan, M. S. (2016). Case study and lessons learned from the ammonium nitrate explosion at the West Fertilizer facility. Journal of hazardous materials, 308, 164-172.

Metzger, K., Akram, H., Feldt, B., Stone, K., Alvey, S., Henley, S., … & Zane, D. (2016). Epidemiologic investigation of injuries associated with the 2013 fertilizer plant explosion in West, Texas. Disaster medicine and public health preparedness, 10(4), 583-590.

Sansom, G., Stone, K., & Horney, J. A. (2018). Investigating Injuries Seen in Area Physician Offices After a Fertilizer Plant Explosion. Texas Public Health Journal, 70(3).

Yonekawa, Y., Hacker, H. D., Lehman, R. E., Beal, C. J., Veldman, P. B., Vyas, N. M., … & Kuperwaser, M. C. (2014). Ocular blast injuries in mass-casualty incidents: the Marathon bombing in Boston, Massachusetts, and the fertilizer plant explosion in West, Texas. Ophthalmology, 121(9), 1670-1676.

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